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RECENT DECISIONS
ADmIRALTY - ACTION UNDER JONES ACT SURvIVEs DEATH OF
TORTFEASOR.-An action was brought under the Jones Act ' on behalf

of the estate of a seaman who was lost at sea through the alleged negligence of the vessel's owner. Before the action was instituted the
owner died. It was contended that, in the absence of any statutory
enactment to the contrary, the action should abate under common-law

principles.

Held: Although the Jones Act makes no explicit provi-

sion for the survival of an action against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor, the history and purpose of the Act indicate that Congress intended such to be the rule; accordingly, an action was maintainable
against the estate of the vessel's owner. Cox v. Roth, 75 Sup. Ct.
242 (1955).
At common law, under the maxim actio personalis moritur cum
persona, tort actions affecting the person abated on the death of the
tortfeasor.2 Statutes today generally make specific provision for the
survival of such actions.3 However, in the absence of such a provision, the right of action still ceases upon the defendant's death. 4 This
is also true in admiralty.5
When Congress, by the enactment of the Jones Act, granted a
specific remedy at law to injured seamen, 6 it did not explicitly state
that the right of action thus granted survived the death of the tortfeasor. However, Congress incorporated into the Act, by reference,
whatever rights or remedies it had granted to railway employees under
similar circumstances. 7 The remedies provided to such workers by
141

STAT.

1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1952).

2 See POLLOCK, TORTS 52 (15th ed., Landon, 1951) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS

§ 900, comment a (1939).
3Ibid. E.g., N.Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 118. Forty-three states have such
statutes. See Cox v. Roth, 75 Sup. Ct. 242, 244 (1955).
4 Gorlitzer v. Wolffberg, 208 N.Y. 475, 102 N.E. 528 (1913).
S See Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 387 (1941); Nordquist v. United
States Trust Co., 188 F.2d 776, 777 (2d Cir. 1951).
6 Prior to the passage of the Jones Act, the general maritime law gave no
right of recovery for fatal injuries to a seaman. See Lindgren v. United
States, 281 U.S. 38, 43 (1930); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 240
(1921).
7"..... [I]n such action all statutes of the United States modifying or ex-

tending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of
any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law ....

and in such action all statutes of the

United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case
of railway employees shall be applicable." 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
§688 (1952).
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the Federal Employers' Liability Act 8 were thereby made available
to seamen. 9 That statute, which provided a right of action to railroad
workers injured by the negligence of their employer, contained no
provision for survival of the action in the event of the defendant's
death. Such a clause was thought unnecessary since railroads are
almost invariably owned by corporations. 10 Accordingly, no statutory
provision applicable to seamen contains, by its terms, a right of action
for personal injuries which survives the tortfeasor.
The precise question of whether actions under the Jones Act
abated on the defendant's death has apparently been presented on only
two previous occasions, both in the Second Circuit. The first time
the issue arose it was held that the failure of Congress to provide for
the survival of such actions indicated that the common-law rule of
abatement should govern.
This point of view was recently overruled
in this Circuit by Nordquist v. United States Trust Co., 1 2 where the
court employed the same reasoning which the Supreme Court adopted
in the case at bar.
In the Nordquist case the court took into consideration Section
57 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,13 which gives to an injured railroad employee a cause of action against "receivers or other
persons" charged with the management of the railroad. Reasoning
that receivership in a corporation is analogous to the death of an individual, 14 the court felt that the congressional intent in incorporating
that section into the Jones Act would be frustrated if a right of action
under the latter statute were held to abate upon the death of the
individual defendant.
In the Cox case the Supreme Court followed that reasoning, and
abandoned the theory upon which the plaintiff had recovered in the
court of appeals. The lower court had not recognized any implied
provision for survival of actions in the Jones Act, but had permitted
the attion to continue because the law of the state where the tort
occurred permits survival of such actions.' 5
835 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §51 et seq. (1952).

9 See De Zon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 665 (1943);
The10Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 118 (1936).
See Cox v. Roth, 75 Sup. Ct 242, 243 (1955).
" See The Miranmr, 31 F.2d 767 (S.D. N.Y. 1929), aff'd mere., 36 F.2d
1021 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 752 (1930).
12 188 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1951).
1335 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 57 (1952). Section 57 defines a common
carrier, for the purpose of liability under the Act, to include persons charged
with the management of the railroad.
14This is a somewhat questionable analogy; the death of an individual
would seem more akin to the dissolution of a corporation than to mere
receivership.
I5Roth v. Cox, 210 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1954), 103 U. OF PA. L. REv. 119. It
had previously been held that a maritime tort action brought in admiralty
survives the death of the tortfeasor when it occurs within the waters of a
state whose laws provide for the survival of such actions. Just v. Chambers,
312 U.S. 383 (1941), 29 CALIF. L. REv. 519.

1955]

RECENT DECISIONS

Viewed pragmatically, the conclusion reached by the Supreme
Court would seem preferable. It obviates the possibility that a seaman from another state may be deprived of a remedy under the Jones
Act because of the failure of the local state legislature to provide for
the survival of local tort actions, and assures him the relief which it
was the purpose of the statute to extend.

X
BANKS-SUIT BY DEPOSITOR IN TORT FOR BREACH OF BANKER-

DEPOSITOR RELATONsHIP.--Defendant bank cashed four checks on
which the names of the payees had been altered, and charged them to
the plaintiff's account. Plaintiff sued in contract for the value of the
checks. In addition, the plaintiff pleaded a cause of action in negligence, alleging that the bank's breach of the "duty" of care imposed
by the depositor-banker relationship caused damage to the plaintiff's
credit and business. The Court held 1 that, under the facts pleaded,
no cause of action in tort arose separate from the contract obligations
of the depositor-banker relationship. Stella Flour & Feed Corp. v.
National City Bank, 285 App. Div. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1st Dep't
1954).
Basically the relationship between a bank and its depositor is that
of debtor and creditor. 2 Under the implied contract between the
parties, the bank's liability on the debt, or account, is discharged only
to the extent that the bank pays out money pursuant to the depositor's
order.3 Consequently, a loss occasioned by the bank's paying a forged
or altered check must be borne by the bank,4 unless the depositor was
negligent in preparing his checks 5 or in examining them on return.6
I2 Three justices concurred in the opinion, two dissented.

See Solicitor for the Affairs of His Majesty's Treasury v. Bankers Trust

Co., 304 N.Y. 282, 291, 107 N.E.2d 448, 452 (1952); Irving Trust Co. v. Leff,
253 N.Y. 359, 361-362, 171 N.E. 569, 570 (1930); Critten v. Chemical Nat.
Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 224, 63 N.E. 969, 970 (1902); Woody v. National Bank,
194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150, 152 (1927).
3 Critten v. Chemical Nat Bank, supra note 2; see Irving Trust Co. v. Leff,
supra note 2; Shipman v. Bank of the State of New York, 126 N.Y. 318,
326-327, 27 N.E. 371, 372 (1891).
4 See City of New York v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N.Y. 64, 184
N.E. 495 (1933) ; see Shipman v. Bank of the State of New York, supra note 3
at 327, 27 N.E. at 372-373; Screenland Magazine, Inc. v. National City Bank,
181 Misc. 454, 460, 42 N.Y.S.2d 286, 290-291 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
5 See City of New York v. Bronx County Trust Co., supra note 4 at 71,
184 N.E. at 497; see Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, supra note 2.
6 Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, supra note 2; Stumpp v. Bank of New
York, 212 App. Div. 608, 209 N.Y. Supp. 396 (1st Dept 1925); Screenland
Magazine, Inc. v. National City Bank, supra note 4. Contra: Weisser's Adm'rs
v. Denison, 10 N.Y. 68 (1854). See also N.Y. NFG. INsT. LAw § 326 (which
states that a bank shall not be liable for payment of a forged or raised check

